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Abstract
The long-term relationship between the prices of natural gas in the United Kingdom and
oil-indexed natural gas in the North West European market is the result of seasonal arbi-
trage. This paper empirically investigates this long-term relationship and offers two main
contributions: (i) To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first study to take into ac-
count important UK spot gas market drivers such as seasonality, temperature and gas storage
injection/withdrawal behaviour when examining the structural relationship between UK and
Continental European markets. (ii) The effect of UK import capacity extensions since 2005,
through both pipeline and LNG regasification capacity, on this long-term relationship will be
analyzed. The results suggest that there is a significant structural break in 2006 when the
two markets decouple and move from an old to a new, much weaker, long-term relationship.
From the end of 2008 onwards, the time at which UK LNG imports started to increase, this
long-term relationship appears to break down altogether.
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1 Introduction
The North West (NW) European natural gas markets are deeply divided into two competing
pricing mechanisms. In Continental Europe, gas supplies are predominantly governed by long-
term supply contracts, indexed to the price of oil products. In contrast, the UK market underwent
liberalization in 1995 and by now is characterized by full gas-on-gas competition and single hub
pricing. That is, UK long-term supply contracts, in contrary to the European Continent, use spot
gas prices as a benchmark for indexation and not oil product prices. Following Melling (2010), the
difference between the two pricing systems has become increasingly pronounced since 2006 when
a large share of UK long-term contracts expired and were rolled over to contracts with spot gas
price indexation. By 2010, spot gas price indexation accounted for approx. 90% of all gas sales
in the UK, whereas only for 25% in Continental Europe. This growing divide between the two
markets results in large tensions only if spot prices diverge significantly from oil-indexed prices.
Two situations might arise. Spot prices might exceed oil-indexed prices for a considerable period,
hence pricing a physical shortage in the market. In this case, gas consumers locked into long-term
supply contracts might face upwards price revisions by their suppliers. In the reverse case, when
spot gas trades at a significant discount to oil-indexed prices, pricing an oversupply of spot gas,
Continental European gas consumers are locked into their long-term positions and cannot benefit
from lower spot prices1, a situation which has prevailed in the market since summer 2008. It
becomes obvious that the stress between the two pricing systems is an increasing function of the
price differential.
However, even in the absence of a contractual linkage between the UK hub prices and the
price of crude oil (or oil products), the two are not independent. UK spot prices are influenced by
storage arbitrage with the Continental European markets during the summer, and demand/supply
imbalances during the winter, facilitated to a large extent by trade flows across the Interconnector
(IUK) pipeline, linking the UK with Belgium and therefore the Continental European markets,
Heather (2010). This arbitrage between the UK and Continental Europe has helped prevent a
structural price divergence between the two markets, and hence kept the tension between them
small.
Since 2005, the UK has expanded its import infrastructure for natural gas by adding two
import pipelines as well as significant LNG regasification capacity. As a result, Heather (2010)
maintains that the UK has become subject to global arbitrage for the marginal supply of natural
gas2. That is, given demand and supply imbalances in the UK market, the marginal supply
might not be priced against Continental European oil-indexed gas, but against global spot LNG
prices. This has the potential to significantly change the long-term relationship between the UK
and Continental European markets. This view is confirmed by Stern and Rogers (2011). They
1They can only benefit from spot price volatility to the degree of volume flexibility dictated by their long-term
supply contract.
2The term marginal supply refers to the last unit which balances demand and supply in the market. The UK
NBP price reflects the value of the marginal supply unit into the UK.
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argue that even if market fundamentals ensure that the price differential between oil-indexed and
hub priced gas is small, there is a threat of a widening differential in an increasingly uncertain
LNG-connected global gas system. In particular, if the addition of UK LNG import capacity has
weakened the long-term relationship between the UK spot price and the oil-indexed price on the
Continent, by affecting the arbitrage dynamics across the IUK pipeline, then the price differential
between UK hub and oil-indexed prices could widen. The resulting friction will then increase the
tension between the two markets even further.
The empirical investigation of this potential weakening lies at the core of the present study.
The following analysis determines the dynamic behaviour of the long-term relationship between
UK NBP hub and NW European gas prices, predominantly oil-indexed, which is conventionally
measured in a cointegration framework. Importantly, the possibility of a price decoupling is
examined. Following the spirit of Ramberg and Parsons (2012), the present study aims to answers
the question whether the extension of natural gas import infrastructure in the UK has lead to
any of the three forms of price decoupling: (i) prices have temporarily deviated from their long-
term relationship to which they will return later; (ii) prices have permanently deviated from the
old relationship and moved into a new long-term relationship; or (iii) the two prices no longer
maintain a long-term relationship with each other at all.
The contributions of this study are threefold: (i) to the best knowledge of the author, this
is the first study to take into account important UK spot gas market drivers such as seasonal-
ity, temperature and gas storage injection/withdrawal behaviour when examining the structural
relationship between UK and Continental European markets. (ii) The effect of import capacity
extensions (pipeline/LNG) on the long-term relationship between UK spot and Continental Eu-
ropean oil-indexed gas prices will be analyzed. In doing so, this study is the first to use a direct
measure of oil-indexed gas prices in the NW European market, the Average German Import
Price (AGIP), rather than price for crude oil. The second contribution is of particular impor-
tance for two reasons. First, it determines whether the opening of the UK to global LNG trade
has permanently broken the long-term relationship between UK and NW European gas markets,
or whether this relationships still exists, yet maybe in a changed form. This information about
the dynamic properties of the price differential between spot and oil-indexed gas prices appears
somewhat critical to large-scale consumers of natural gas, if positioned in long-term oil-indexed
supply contracts. Further, it informs exporters of natural gas into the NW European market, as
price decoupling increases the pressure to move away from oil-indexation. Second, it provides an
improved understanding of how the UK domestic gas market is exposed to global (exogenous)
oil price movements. (iii) The empirical analysis is based on a larger dataset compared to pre-
vious research, which covered data up until and including 2005. This will provide the basis for
re-examining the long-term structural relationship between the UK and Continental European
markets.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides a brief overview of the
UK natural gas market and its interconnection. Section 1.2 describes the rationale for a linkage
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of gas to oil product prices. It goes on to motivate in more detail the connection of UK spot
prices to oil-indexed prices through arbitrage across the Interconnector. The potential influence
of LNG on the arbitrage dynamics is analyzed in section 1.3 and a brief overview of the price
data between 1999-2011 is given in section A.1. The relevant empirical literature in the field is
presented in section 2. Details about the energy market data and its time series characteristics
are discussed in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 respectively describe the econometric methodology
applied in this study and present the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 The UK gas market: liberalization and interconnection
In 1995 the UK market for natural gas was subject to a deep structural change, namely a transition
from a vertically-integrated and publicly owned monopoly to a fully liberalized gas market3. In
this liberalized market, natural gas prices are determined by the forces of demand and supply,
reflecting local imbalances4. The price for natural gas in the UK is determined at a virtual hub,
called the National Balancing Point (NBP). The UK NBP is generally regarded as a mature
market with sufficient depth and liquidity. The average churn rate (the number of times gas
contracts are traded before physical flows take place) is, at around 15 in 2010, significantly
higher than in other NW European spot markets (between 2-3), Stern and Rogers (2011).
Along with deregulation came the development of gas trading on both a national and interna-
tional level, facilitated by the opening of the Interconnector UK (IUK) pipeline between Bacton
(UK) and Zeebrugge (Belgium) in 19985. With an import (export) capacity of 25.5 bcma6 (20.0
bcma), the pipeline established the first physical link of the newly liberalized UK market with
the Continental European markets, therefore allowing to trade on arbitrage opportunities across
the two markets7.
Further physical linkages with Continental European gas markets followed in more recent
years. In December 2006, the Balgzand (Netherlands) and Bacton interconnector, called the BBL
pipeline, became operational and secured an import capacity from the Netherlands to the UK of
15 bcma. In October 2007, the Langeled pipeline between Nyhamma (Norway) and Easington
(UK) opened fully, and with an import capacity of 25.5 bcma, is the longest underwater pipeline
worldwide8.
In addition to pipeline capacity, 2005 marked the introduction of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the UK market with the opening of the Isle of Grain regasification terminals9. Since then,
3Newbery (1999) provides a thorough account of the restructuring process of the UK gas and electricity sectors.
4A detailed description of UK gas markets and key price drivers is given in Wright (2006).
5A comprehensive analysis of the functioning of UK gas trading can be found in Heather (2010).
6bcma billion cubic meters annually.
7The initial import capacity in 1998 was only 8 bcma. This was only later expanded in three phases to reach
the current 25.5 bcma (as from October 2007). For a history of the IUK and a discussion of its economic impact,
see Futyan (2006). For technical details visit http://www.interconnector.com.
8See Gassco (2010).
9Regasification refers to the transition of natural gas from the liquid to the gaseous state, i.e. controlled warming.
LNG enters the importing country in a liquid state and is then regasified. In this study, regasification capacity is
used interchangeably with LNG import capacity.
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LNG imports have played a key role in UK gas supply and import capacity has continuously
expanded. Table 1 provides an overview of the existing UK regasification capacity of about 51.5
bcma, which represents about 57 % of the UK’s natural gas demand in 2009, of 90.8 bcm10.
In addition to existing import capacity, there are potential extensions. Proposed is a capacity
extension of the Isle of Grain site, owned by National Grid, with unknown commissioning date11,
as well as the investment into an offshore terminal, with a capacity of 3-6 bcma12.
Table 1: UK LNG Regasification Capacity
Terminal Name Operator/Developer Commissioning Date Landfall in the UK Capacity in bcma
Isle of Grain 1/2 National Grid 2005 Isle of Grain 13.5
Gasport Excelerate 2007 Teesside ≈ 4
Dragon BG/Petronas 2009 Milford Haven 6
South Hook 1 QP/ExxonMobil 2009 Milford Haven 10.5
South Hook 2 QP/EcconMobil 2010 Milford Haven 10.5
Isle of Grain 3 National Grid 2010 Isle of Grain 7
Total existing ≈ 51.5
Isle of Grain 4 National Grid ? River Medway ?
Source: Heather (2010) and NationalGrid (2010). QP Qatar Petroleum. BG British Gas (Centrica).
1.2 Rationale for crude oil and natural gas price linkage
A dominant share of gas supplies into NW Europe is delivered and priced against long-term
supply contracts indexed to the price of oil products. While contractual terms are confidential
and subject to revisions, oil products used for indexation are predominantly light fuel oil (gasoil)
and heavy fuel oil, Stern (2007). Long-term contract gas prices are then indexed to those prices
with a lag of up to 9 months 13. Further, long-term contracts provide consumption flexibility over
the gas year14. This flexibility is expressed as a band of potential gas offtake around the Annual
Contract Quantity (ACQ), usually between around 85% and 120%, Stern and Rogers (2011).
The minimum consumption level, which has to be paid for irrespective of actual consumption, is
called the take-or-pay level (TOP). Within these bounds, gas consumers are able to substitute
contracted pipeline gas with other forms of supply, e.g. from European spot gas hubs such as the
UK NBP, depending on relative price signals.
There are several factors which naturally link the prices of crude oil and natural gas. With
a focus on the US, Villar and Joutz (2006) categorized these into demand and supply factors.
On the demand side, price linkage occurs due to competition at the ’burner-tip’. Crude oil
10See IEA (2010).
11See NationalGrid (2010).
12See Reuters (2011a).
13Other indexing targets may include inflation or other commodity prices. For an extensive discussion of oil-
indexation and its historical context, see Melling (2010).
14The gas-year starts on October 1st and ends on September 30th of the following calendar year.
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and natural gas are competitive substitutes predominantly in the power generation sector. An
increase in the price of crude oil will therefore induce some generators to switch to natural gas.
All else being equal, this demand increase for natural gas will push up its price until it converges
with the price of oil products and the motivation to switch input fuels is removed.
On the supply side, the linkage is less clear cut than on the demand side. First, an increase
in the price of crude oil may stimulate oil drilling and hence the production of associated gas15.
The increase in gas production will depress its market price. Second, natural gas and crude oil
are competing for the same upstream drilling assets. An increase in the price of crude oil will
stimulate oil drilling and hence increase the production costs of natural gas, which pushes up its
price. Third, as many of the firms drilling for crude oil also drill for natural gas, increasing oil
prices result in an increased cash-flow of drilling companies and hence free resources for natural
gas drilling. Increased natural gas production again depresses its price16.
However, in the European context, Finon (2008) claims that the original rationale for an oil-
gas price linkage, competition at the burner-tip, has become increasingly dubious for two reasons.
First, there has been a continuous reduction of dual-fired generation capacity in the EU power
sector. Second, the dying out of oil-based generation. Similarly, Stern (2009) attributes the
weakening rationale for a linkage of long-term contract gas prices to those of oil products in NW
Europe to four key factors17: the virtual elimination of oil products from many stationary energy
sectors in NW European energy markets, the high cost of maintaining oil-burning equipment and
oil stocks, the improvement in gas-burning efficiencies and increasing environmental concerns,
especially with regards to high carbon emission of oil-fired power generation. In summary, Stern
(2009) argues that there is only very limited oil switching capacity remaining in those markets,
weakening the rationale for contractual gas price indexation to those of oil products, in particular
since the mid 2000s18.
Despite the absence of a contractual link between the UK gas price to those of oil products, the
UK NBP price might nevertheless reflect variations in crude oil prices and therefore oil product
prices. This is due to limited gas storage capacity in the UK and arbitrage between the UK
NBP and oil-indexed gas across the IUK pipeline. The historical flow pattern across the IUK
for the year 2003-05 is depicted in figure 1, that is before the opening of UK LNG regasification
capacity. The flow data highlights the strongly seasonal pattern of gas trades across the pipeline.
The summer months are characterized by significant forward flow, exporting natural gas into
the NW European market, where storage is refilled. As long as long-term contract gas is priced
above UK NBP, and pipeline consumers are within the flexibility limits dictated by their supply
contracts, that is they can substitute expensive pipeline gas for cheaper spot gas, there is an
opportunity for arbitrage. The additional demand from NW European markets pulls the UK
15Associated gas is a by-product to crude oil production, as opposed to dry gas.
16Competition for upstream drilling assets as well as competition at the ’burner-tip’ as a rationale for price
linkage is also maintained by IEA (2009).
17For an earlier analysis of the price linkage of long-term gas contracts to those of oil products, see Stern (2007).
18In a recent publication, Stern and Rogers (2011) examine the progress of the transition from oil-indexed to
hub-based pricing since 2009 and its likely evolution over the next few years.
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Figure 1: Interconnector Daily Pipeline Flows pre LNG (Weekly average in mcm/day) 2003-2005,
Source: Interconnector
NBP price higher, potentially until it reaches the contract price and the initial motivation for
arbitrage is removed, all else being equal. This process links the UK NBP price to those of oil
products despite the absence of any contractual indexation. In the reverse case, UK NBP being
priced above oil-indexed gas, long-term contract consumers on the continent can sell gas into the
UK market and back-fill with cheaper pipeline gas. This then puts downwards pressure on the
UK price, potentially until it converges with lower priced long-term contract gas.
During the winter months, the UK peak heating season, domestic demand for natural gas in-
creases and limited storage capacity turns the UK into a net importer. The net trade flows across
the IUK are reversed. That is, before the opening of additional pipeline capacity (BBL/Langeled)
and LNG regasification capacity, the marginal supply balancing the UK market during peak con-
sumption months came from the NW European market. In order to attract sufficient quantities,
the UK NBP price must reflect the value of this marginal supply unit, which means rise to
the price level of the long-term contract gas on the European continent. Again, this provides
a rationale for the connection of UK NBP to oil-indexed gas prices and therefore to oil price
movements.
1.3 The influence of LNG on UK NBP pricing
The important role global trade in LNG plays in re-balancing the international gas-system is
well documented in Rogers (2010)19. In the UK, LNG has become increasingly important in
19Rogers (2010) provides a detailed study on LNG trade flows in the Atlantic basin. The author models the
dynamics of pipeline gas-LNG arbitrage scenarios between Europe and North America, given various demand and
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securing supply of natural gas, in particular in the light of declining domestic production. The
continuous expansion of import capacity exposes the UK, and therefore the UK NBP price, to
global arbitrage for the marginal supply of natural gas, Heather (2010). Appendix A.1 provides
a brief discussion of relative global natural gas prices, in particular that of spot LNG relative to
oil-indexed, for the period 1999-2011.
Total LNG import capacity in the UK has increased significantly with the completion of
the South Hook 2 terminal in 2010 and lies now just over 50 bcma. Figure 2 illustrates the
development of UK LNG imports and their seasonal behaviour. As opposed to import capacity,
actual imports picked up at the end of 2008 and have continuously risen until the first half of
2011, after which they retreated markedly. Weekly averaged imports into the UK peaked in April
2011 with just over 100 mcm/day20.
Trade in LNG changes the historical relationship between UK NBP and oil-indexed prices,
as it introduces an additional source for the marginal unit of supply in the UK market. That
is, whether the UK NBP will converge with the oil-indexed price on the continent is no longer
determined by relative demand and supply imbalances in the UK alone. It is now also determined
by global energy prices, in particular that of LNG relative to oil-indexed gas.
0
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2011 2010 2009 2008
Figure 2: UK LNG imports (Weekly average in mcm/day) 2011-08, Source: Bloomberg/Nation-
alGrid
During the winter months, the UK is a net importer of natural gas. If sufficient spot LNG
can be delivered to balance the UK market, at a cost below that of oil-indexed pipeline gas,
supply uncertainties.
20This coincides with the ramp-up of the last Qatari LNG liquefaction train, shortly before in February 2011,
Reuters (2011b).
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the UK NBP price will increase to that of spot LNG but remain below that of oil-indexed
supply21. Given the relative price of spot LNG to oil-indexed gas, seasonal price convergence
between the UK NBP and oil-indexed gas is then no longer necessary. Whether convergence
occurs during peak UK demand periods is determined by factors influencing global LNG spot
prices. In particular, higher LNG demand from key importers, such as Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan, will increase the pressure on global LNG spot markets. On the supply side, LNG
liquefaction constraints in major producing countries, such as Qatar and Algeria, exert further
pressure on spot prices. In general, tighter global LNG markets will feed into the UK market by
increasing the upward pressure on the NBP price. It will have to increase in order to attract the
marginal cargo during peak demand periods. Convergence of UK NBP to oil-indexed prices is
still possible, but conditional on at least one of the following two conditions: (i) global spot LNG
prices exceed those of oil-indexed gas in Continental Europe, and (ii) UK peak demand (winter)
exceeds available spot LNG, such that the marginal supply unit balancing the market, will have
to be attracted from the European continent.
The effect on UK NBP pricing during the summer months, when the UK is a net gas exporter,
is less clear. If global LNG spot prices are below those of oil-indexed gas on the European conti-
nent, there is an arbitrage opportunity for NW European gas consumers positioned in long-term
supply contracts, given they are confident about meeting their take-or-pay (TOP) obligations.
LNG could then be imported into the UK and priced at the NBP, only for it to be re-exported
through the IUK pipeline22. LNG essentially overflows into the NW European market, using
the UK as an ’offshore unloading jetty’, Rogers (2010). This additional pull on the UK market
would result in upward pressure on the UK NBP price until it ultimately converges with that of
oil-indexed gas, even during summer months. Whether TOP obligations pose a limit to this ar-
bitrage process, and hence to price convergence, is determined by the level of demand for natural
gas on the European continent.
Figure 3 illustrates the seasonal behaviour of the trade flows across the IUK pipeline for
the years 2008-11. Compared to the period 2003-05, the volatility of export flows during the
summer appears to have increased, whereas the general seasonal flow pattern has dampened,
Rogers (2010). Net imports back into the UK during peak demand periods appear to start later
in the year and stop earlier, whereas strong exports during the summer months persist. This
lends intuitive support to the argument that additional supply from Norway and in the form of
LNG has substituted oil-indexed pipeline gas from the NW European markets, which would have
entered the UK through the IUK during winter months.
21This equally holds for marginal supply secured through the BBL and Langeled pipelines and priced at European
(UK) hub spot prices.
22This assumes that LNG cannot enter Continental Europe directly, as constraints in regasification capacity are
binding. However, the growth in Continental European regasification capacity over the recent years makes this
scenario less likely, GIE (2011).
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Figure 3: Interconnector Daily Pipeline Flows post LNG (Weekly average in mcm/day) 2008-
2011, Source: Interconnector
2 Relevant literature
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the relationship between energy prices, some
of which is directly relevant to the present study. Serletis and Herbert (1999) investigate the
empirical relationship between natural gas, fuel oil and power prices in North America. Their
results show evidence of a cointegrating relationship between natural gas and fuel oil prices, which
is attributed to an effective arbitrage mechanism between the two fuels in industrial usage23.
Power prices, however, show no structural relationship with the other fuels.
In a later study, Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) examine the long-run relationship between
crude oil, natural gas and coal prices. Their findings suggest that the global market for crude oil
is a single and highly integrated market. Further, while there exists a cointegrating relationship
between different coal prices across the US, the degree of market integration is much weaker.
Across primary energy markets, cointegration is only found to be very weak. In a similar study,
Villar and Joutz (2006) investigate the relationship between the Henry Hub natural gas price in
the United States and the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price. They find a stable cointe-
grating relationship between the two fuels for the period 1989-2005. Further, they argue that the
natural gas price is growing at a slightly faster rate than the crude oil price, narrowing the gap
between them over time24.
Siliverstovs et al. (2005) investigate the integration of international natural gas markets in the
23Fuel oil and natural gas are competitive substitutes for the use in industrial boilers.
24For another study with a focus on the relationship between the US Henry Hub gas price and the crude oil
price, see Hartley et al. (2008).
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time period between the early 1990s and 2004. They find significant evidence for highly integrated
markets within the North American and European continents. Integration across those markets,
however, is rejected. This strong divide between the North American and European gas market
during the sample period, so the authors, highlights the limited effect inter-continental gas trade
has on price convergence, lending support to the market power of regional suppliers.
In a similar fashion, Neumann et al. (2006) analyze the integration of European gas mar-
kets. They use daily day-ahead prices between March 2000 to February 2005 in a Kalman filter
framework in order to examine price convergence between major UK and Continental European
gas trading hubs. Their findings suggest that there is almost perfect convergence between the
NBP and Zeebrugge (Belgium) hubs. Within-continent convergence, however, is found to be
only weak, which could be the result of only limited degrees of maturity of the other Continental
European hubs25.
At the core of this study lies the structural relationship between the UK NBP price and the
price of oil-indexed gas in NW Europe. Previous work on the empirical connection of UK gas
prices and the price of oil has produced mixed results. Following the liberalization of the UK gas
market in 1995, Barton and Vermeire (1999) claim that gas-on-gas competition in the UK has
weakened the oil and gas price link. They argue that gas prices can now move over the range
determined by, on the lower end, the marginal cost of gas production and, on the higher end,
the price at which consumers would switch to oil. In 1998 the IUK opened and connected the
until then isolated UK gas market to the oil-indexed Continental European gas markets. Gas
arbitrage across the North sea, between the NBP and oil-indexed pipeline gas on the Continent,
and traded via the IUK, re-established the price link between natural gas and crude oil, ILEX
(2001). Together, Barton and Vermeire (1999) and ILEX (2001) argue for a weak price link before
and a strong price link after the opening of the interconnector.
However, Asche et al. (2006) present contradicting empirical evidence. They use a co-
integration framework in order to detect a significant long-term relationship between the UK
gas (NBP) and crude oil (Brent) prices. They focussed their attention on the period 1995-98.
During those four years, the UK gas market was deregulated yet not physically connected to
the continental gas markets. For the period of market isolation (1995-98), they find a significant
co-integrating relationship between Brent and NBP. Co-integration is rejected for the period after
the opening of the IUK, i.e. after 1998 until the end of their sample in 2002. These results appear
counterintuitive, as it is should be the arbitrage across the IUK which is responsible for the co-
integration between the two. In a later study, Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2007) re-examine the
co-integration relationship, based on a sample of Brent spot prices and the Heren Monthly gas
price index between 1996 and 2003. Their findings support the idea of a long-term relationship
between UK gas and crude oil prices. Further, testing for time-variation in co-integration, their
econometric specification accepts co-integration over the entire sample period, even pre-dating
the opening of the IUK in 1998.
25See Stern and Rogers (2011) for a detailed discussion on the relative maturity of European gas trading hubs.
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Over the second half of the past decade, the role of LNG in global gas trade has become
of significant importance, as it allows arbitrage across previously segmented markets. Neumann
(2009) picks up on the results of Siliverstovs et al. (2005) and investigates whether LNG has led
to the integration of natural gas markets in North American, Europe and Asia. Their results
identify LNG as the key driver of international transmission of regional price impacts, suggesting
an increasing convergence of daily spot prices on either side of the Atlantic Basin.
Very close to the present analysis is a study by Ramberg and Parsons (2012). They investi-
gate the relationship of WTI crude oil prices and Henry hub prices in the US, based on weekly
price data over the period 1997 through 2009. Specifically, the authors assess whether prices have
decoupled. The results of a conditional vector error correction model, controlling for seasonality,
weather variables and hurricane related shut-ins, suggest the existence of a cointegrating rela-
tionship, in which changes in the price of crude oil appear to translate into changes in the price
of natural gas. Further, movements of the natural gas price away from this long-run relationship
tend to reverse, such that it will be re-established in equilibrium. Ramberg and Parsons (2012)
argue, however, that the long-run relationship was likely subject to a gradual shift during the
sample period. This, so the authors, is a form of decoupling in which the prices permanently
moved from an old to a new long-run relationship, rather than the relationship being permanently
severed.
In context of NW European natural gas markets, the literature in the field of price co-
integration between UK NBP and Continental Europe does not deliver clear cut results and
the question whether there is a stable long-run relationship between oil and natural gas is a
difficult one to answer. The current consensus appears to be one of convergence between NBP
and Continental European spot prices, facilitated by arbitrage across the IUK. However, the
question of how LNG affects the structural relationship between UK NBP and oil-indexed gas
on the European continent remains unanswered. This study is only aware of co-integration
(convergence) studies using data up until and including 2005. Since then, however, the UK and
NW European natural gas markets were subject to significant changes. First, there has been a
large change in energy price volatility and risk perception. While the NBP spot market price
fluctuated between 1.5 and 5 USD/mmbtu26 between 1997 and the end of 2004, prices moved
within a significantly higher band of around 4-14 USD/mmbtu between the beginning of 2005
and 201027. By 2009, UK NBP price had declined to the lower end of this band as a result of
lower global demand for energy following the 2008 financial crisis28. Second, the UK increased its
pipeline interconnection with neighbouring NW European gas markets in addition to the opening
of several LNG regasification terminals. The events are summarized in figure 4.
There is strong reason to believe that these events had a large impact on UK gas price
26mmbtu million British thermal units.
27See Rogers (2010).
28Heather (2010) further outlines the increasing risk aversion in global energy markets as a result of the crisis,
shifting significant volumes of gas trading from the less regulated over-the-counter (OTC) market onto regulated
exchanges with decreased counter-party risk.
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dynamics and are the motivation for this study to revisit the issue of estimating the structural
relationship between the UK NBP and oil-indexed gas prices on the European continent.
1995: Liberalization of UK gas market 
1998: Opening Interconnector 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
2009: Dragon and 
SouthHook 1 LNG 
2010: SouthHook 2 and 
Isle of Grain 3 LNG 
2005: Opening Isle 
of Grain 1 & 2 LNG 
2006: Opening BBL 
2007: Opening Langeled, Gasport 
LNG 
Covered by empirical research on cointegration. 
2008: Global financial crisis 
Figure 4: Major Events in the UK Gas Market, 1995-2010
3 Energy market data: sources and characteristics
Estimation is based on two sets of data. The first set are energy prices, whose sources and
time series characteristics are discussed in the next section. The second set are control variables
which are assumed to affect the price of natural gas, namely natural gas storage injections and
temperature. They are discussed in section 3.2.
3.1 Natural gas prices
There is not just one wholesale price of natural gas in the UK29. Two price series are used
to capture the dynamics of the UK NBP gas price. The first series is the Over-the-Counter
(OTC) day-ahead or ’spot’ market price. Trade on the OTC market is conducted bilaterally
or through a broker and terms are therefore confidential. The OTC price used is provided by
brokers, such as ICAP and Spectron, and obtained via Bloomberg. The second UK natural gas
price series used is the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) front-month (one-month ahead) futures
contract. The futures market was established in January 1997 and serves to hedge the risk in the
underlying spot market30. Both UK NBP prices are traded in GBpence/therm and are converted
29See extensive discussion in Wright (2006) for details on UK wholesale gas price formation.
30Compared to the rather opaque OTC price, the exchange traded futures price is completely transparent. While
the futures price is recorded at a centralized exchange, the OTC price is reported to information agencies such as
Platts or ICIS Heren. Reporters might have their own definition of ’price’ and so discrepancies between the different
information providers are not uncommon and can be large. See p. 18 in Energy Information Administration (2002).
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into USD/mmbtu. The sample covers 12 years of monthly data, from September 1999 through
September 2011. While the two wholesale gas prices are highly correlated, the front-month futures
price exhibits slightly higher levels of volatility over the sample period31.
In place of the Continental European gas price, the Average German Import Price (AGIP)
is used, which is published each month by the German Office for Economics and Export Control
and denominated in Euro per terajoule. The series is a volume weighted import price into the
German market and is a common industry proxy for oil-indexed supply contract prices on the
European continent, Stern (2009). The AGIP is converted into USD/mmbtu using the reference
exchange rate of the European Central bank.
This study is concerned with the structural relationship between the oil-indexed price in the
NW European market, for which the AGIP is a proxy, and the UK NBP price and, in particular,
with the differential (ymt ) between the two, which is given by
ymt = AGIPt −NBPmt (1)
where m = OTC or front-month (futures), depending on which UK NBP price is employed. Both
prices and the differential are plotted in figure 532.
In contrast to the prices, the differential appears to be stationary, with a constant mean and
variance over time33. Its autocorrelation function (ACF) and empirical distribution are plotted in
figure 6. The empirical distribution shows a positive skew relative to a normal distribution, with
clear signs of significant negative outliers. These outliers, consistent with figure 5, are identified
as February 2005 and the period November 2005 to February 2006. During the later period,
several events posed significant upward pressure on the UK NBP price. Rogers (2010) outlines
three main contributors to the tight UK supply during the winter 2005-06. First, an early spell
of cold weather increased UK demand for natural gas in November 2005, which was not met by
sufficient supply from Continental European gas storage owners, over fears of not meeting their
domestic demand during that winter. Second, Indonesian underperformance in supplying LNG
to Asian markets pushed the price of spot LNG cargoes in excess of 15 USD/mmbtu. Third, UK
supply was further tightened by problems with the UK’s largest gas storage facility, the depleted
Rough gas field34. To control for the effects of these events on the UK NBP price, the following
dummy variable is defined and used in the estimation.
Winter
05/06
t =
1 if t = 2005(11) to 2006(2)0 otherwise (2)
31Descriptive statistics and a table of pairwise correlations are provided in Appendix A.2, in tables 6 and 7
respectively.
32For a more complete discussion of the time series characteristics of the prices, see appendix A.
33For the results of a formal ADF/PP stationarity test, see Appendix A.3. The null-hypothesis of a unit root in
the differential can safely be rejected at the 5% significance level, i.e. the differential is stationary.
34There was a fire on an offshore platform of the Rough gas storage facility on February 16th, 2006, which
reduced effective supply into the UK transmission system, see Centrica (2006)
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Figure 5: AGIP, NBP OTC and Differential (in USD/mmbtu): September 1999 to November
2011
Finally, UK gas demand is highly seasonal. Winter months are characterized by peak natural
gas demand as a result of higher residential heating demand, pushing the UK NBP price upward
to attract sufficient supply and balance the market. The AGIP does not exhibit such seasonal
movements. It is to a large extent determined by lagged oil product prices, which determined on a
global market, are not subject to seasonal swings. The constructed differential therefore exhibits
a seasonal pattern, winter months being associated with a higher UK NBP price, hence a lower
differential. This motivates the inclusion of a seasonal component in the estimation framework.
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Figure 6: AGIP-NBP OTC differential, ACF (PACF), distribution and spectral density
3.2 Short-term market drivers
The UK market for natural gas is competitive and demand is highly variable. Temperature
induced changes to residential heating demand account for the majority of the seasonal variation
in total gas demand, Wright (2006). In the short-term, demand changes not necessarily in line
with supply and gas storage becomes an important marginal unit of supply during peak demand
periods. Given the close interconnection of temperature and storage behaviour and its effect on
short-term demand and supply imbalances, it is reasonable to assume that these variables are
key drivers of near-term natural gas prices35. In particular, it is assumed that deviations from
normal (expected) temperature and storage injections and withdrawals drive variations in the
spot, and to a lesser extent, front-month prices used.
3.2.1 Storage
For the period January 2000 until September 2004, storage injections/withdrawals are obtained
from the UK gas balance. The balance is calculated based on UK domestic gas production and
import data as well as domestic consumption and export demand. The data is provided by
National Grid and DECC36. This study assumes that any demand and supply imbalances in a
35Mu (2007) examines the effect of weather and storage shocks to US natural gas futures prices. His empirical
findings suggest a significant weather effect on both conditional mean and volatility of natural gas futures returns.
36DECC UK Department for Energy and Climate Change.
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particular month are smoothed by a storage injection/withdrawal in that month. The balance is
plotted in figure 16 in Appendix A.4. For the period October 2004 through to September 2011,
explicit natural gas storage information for the UK is provided by National Grid. Given monthly
storage level data, monthly injections/withdrawals are calculated. Let DSt be the deviation of
monthly storage injection/withdrawal from the normal (expected) level of injection/withdrawal
for that month. It is defined by
DSt = INJt − INJm (3)
where INJt is the injection/withdrawal at time t and INJm is the corresponding mth month
average injection/withdrawal37. Figure 7 illustrates both the actual storage changes and monthly
averages as well as the calculated deviations DSt.
A positive value for DSt means that this month was either characterized by higher (lower)
than normal storage withdrawal (injection). A positive DSt is therefore associated with upward
pressure on the UK NBP price. A negative DSt, means that the month is characterized by lower
(higher) than normal storage withdrawal (injection), which puts downward pressure on the UK
NBP price. These effects and their sample frequencies are summarized in table 2.
Table 2: UK Natural Gas Storage Injection/Withdrawal, deviations from normal
Deviation Storage Injection or Storage Withdrawal Count Hypothesized Effect on
UK NBP spot price
DSt > 0 : < Normal or > Normal 71 Upward pressure
DSt < 0 : > Normal or < Normal 70 Downward pressure
DS = Actual Injection (Withdrawal) - Normal Injection (Withdrawal)
37E.g. t = January 2005 and m = January, such that INJm is the average injection/withdrawal over all months
January in the sample.
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Figure 7: UK natural gas storage injections (in mcm) - Source: National Grid, author’s calcula-
tion.
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3.2.2 Temperature
Temperature data is included in the form of Heating Degree Days (HDD). HDD measures the
extent to which outside temperature Tt at date t is below a given base temperature B. While any
base temperature could be used in theory, this study employs the conventional base temperatures
of 15.5 and 18 degrees Celsius. Let HDDt be defined by
HDDt =
B − Tt if B − Tt > 00 if B − Tt <= 0 (4)
where B is equal to 15.5 or 18. Equation (4) is calculated for each day in the sample period and
summed up for each month, providing a measure of aggregate monthly heating demand. Daily
temperature data for the UK (country average) is obtained from Bloomberg. Deviations from
normal heating demand are calculated as
DHDDt = HDDt −HDDm (5)
where HDDm is the corresponding mth month average38. A positive value for DHDDt indicates
that the month was colder than the normal month. This should provide upward pressure on
residential heating demand in the UK and therefore upward pressure on the UK NBP price. A
negative value for DHDDt, in a similar fashion, should be associated with downward pressure
on the UK NBP price. These effects and their sample frequencies are summarized in table 3.
Table 3: UK Heating Degree Days (HDD), deviation from normal
HDD Deviation Count Baseline 18C Count Baseline 15.5C Hypothesized Effect on
UK NBP spot price
DHDDt > 0 : 67 65 Upward pressure
DHDDt < 0 : 74 76 Downward pressure
DHDD = ActualHDD for the month - Normal (Average) for the month.
Following Mu (2007), the effects of temperature on the NBP price are expected to be more
pronounced in the case of spot prices than front-month futures price. Temperature induced
demand variations trigger physical demand and supply rebalancing, which is achieved by spot
price changes, rather than futures price changes. Figure 8 illustrates both HDD and its deviations
from normal.
38E.g. t = January 2005 and m = January, such that HDDm is the average HDD over all months January in
the sample.
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Figure 8: UK Heating Degree Days (HDD), monthly aggregates - Source: Bloomberg
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4 Econometric methods
At the core of this study lies the testing for existence and stability of a long-run relationship, or
’coupling’, between oil-indexed gas prices and the UK NBP price. The literature on energy price
dependence has conventionally modelled price coupling in a cointegration framework. Only if
prices are cointegrated, that is they share a common stochastic trend, are they coupled, and any
deviation from the common trend path is temporary39. In particular, if there is a cointegrating
relationship, this study aims to identify whether a break in the cointegrating relationship exists,
which manifests itself in any of the three forms of price decoupling, as discussed by Ramberg and
Parsons (2012):
(i) Prices have temporarily broken away from their long-term relationship, to which they will
later return. Implies: no break in the cointegrating relationship.
(ii) Prices have permanently broken away from the old long-term relationship and have entered
a new long-term relationship. Implies: a regime shift in the cointegrating relationship.
(iii) Prices broke away from the old relationship and no longer maintain a long-term relationship
with each other at all. Implies: prices are no longer cointegrated.
To investigate the existence of any of these three mutually exclusive forms of price decoupling, the
estimation will follow two parallel methodological approaches. First, section 4.1 discusses price
(de)coupling in its conventional framework - cointegration. Here, a long-run model is estimated
which connects the two natural gas prices in equilibrium. The existence and stability of any
long-run relationship between the two prices is then based on the time series characteristics of
the estimated residual from this long-run model. In this approach, the potential break dates
are determined endogenously. In the second approach, the existence and stability of a long-
run relationship between the two prices is based directly on the time series characteristics of
their differential. Specifically, the AGIP-UK NBP price differential is modelled in an unobserved
components model (UCM), which allows to test for the effect of break-dates whose timing is
known a priori, while controlling for time-varying seasonality. This approach is discussed in
section 4.2.
The reason for using two parallel approaches is that, in the context of the question at hand,
both approaches have relative advantages as well as disadvantages. The first approach, conven-
tional cointegration, tests for a single break in a cointegrating vector at an unknown date. While
this approach does not require a priori knowledge of the timing of the break, it maintains the
restrictive assumption that after the break-date both series are still cointegrated. The second
39It needs to be highlighted here, that the present study is purely interested in the existence and dynamics of the
long-run equilibrium relationship between the two natural gas prices. That is, the short-run adjustment process
to deviations from this long-run equilibrium, which is commonly modelled in an Error Correction Model (ECM),
is not considered. The ECM includes (lagged) first-differences of the observations which would reduce the already
limited effective sample size further. For this reason, only the long-run equilibrium model is estimated.
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approach, the UCM, does not require this restriction. However, this approach tests for the sig-
nificance of break-dates whose timing is known a priori. Both approaches assess the question of
existence and stability of a long-run relationship from somewhat different perspectives, such that
they are regarded as complements rather than complete substitutes.
4.1 Cointegration and stability
The existence of a cointegrating relationship between the two natural gas prices is determined by
applying the usual cointegration tests40, which assume the following underlying long-run model
(LRM) relationship:
log(nbpmt ) = α+ βlog(agipt) + t (6)
where m = OTC or front-month (futures), depending on which UK NBP price is employed. α
is a constant, which measures differences in the levels of the two prices, and β measures the
relationship between the two prices41. In particular, if β = 0, prices maintain no long-term
relationship, whereas β = 1 means they are proportional42. The LRM in equation (6) only forms
a very basic specification and the model is therefore extended to include controls for the deviations
of normal storage behaviour and temperature, as defined by equations (3) and (5) respectively,
as well as for the outlier in the winter 2005/06, as given by equation (2). The extended LRM is
given by:
log(nbpmt ) = α+ βlog(agipt) + φ1Winter
05/06
t + φ2DSt + φ3DHDDt + t (7)
While estimation of this LRM determines the coupling of the two prices over the entire sample
period, it provides no information about the stability of the parameters α and β over time, nor
does it allow for cointegration to hold only over sub-samples. Both of these cases correspond to
a break in the cointegrating relationship described in equation (7).
The first case, namely a change in the parameters α and β at an unknown break date,
can be addressed in the conventional cointegration framework. The standard testing procedure
is extended to allow for the possibility of a regime shift in the cointegrating relationship, as
originally proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996). They define structural change as a change
40Cointegration will be established based on three test procedures, namely the Johansen-test for system cointe-
gration and the Engle-Granger and Phillip-Ouliaris single equation residual based tests. For a formal discussion of
the concept of cointegration and the test procedures, see Greene (2008).
41If the residuals from the estimation of the LRM in equation (6) are stationary, then the two prices series are
said to be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, −β).
42Both prices are in logarithms, such that β gives the elasticity of the UK NBP prices to changes in the AGIP
series.
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of the constant and/or slope of the cointegrating regression, using the timing-dummy variable
δtτ =
0 if t 6 [Tτ ]1 if t > [Tτ ]
where τ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the (relative) timing of the break point43, and t = 1, ..., T . Importantly,
τ is not known a priori and is estimated to be the point where a break is most likely. The
null-hypothesis of their test is that of no cointegration of the two prices. In the present study,
two alternative hypotheses are of particular interest. The first alternative hypothesis is that
cointegration holds with a single level shift at unknown time Tτ , that is
log(nbpmt ) = α1 + α2δtτ + βlog(agipt) + φ1Winter
05/06
t + φ2DSt + φ3DHDDt + t (8)
where α2 is the shift in the level from period Tτ onwards. The second alternative hypothesis is
that cointegration holds with a single level and slope (regime) shift at unknown time Tτ , that is
log(nbpmt ) = α1 + α2δtτ + β1log(agipt) + β2log(agipt)δtτ + φ1Winter
05/06
t
+ φ2DSt + φ3DHDDt + t (9)
where α2 and β2 are the level and slope change respectively from period Tτ onwards. Based on
the estimated break-point τ , a cointegrating regression on each side of the break point provides
insight into how constant and slope coefficients have changed.
The advantage of this approach is that it does not require a priori knowledge of the break-
date in the sample, rather it produces an estimated date at which a break is most likely. That
is, it helps identify the point in time at which prices have moved from an old to a new long-
term relationship, as both alternative hypotheses state that cointegration holds on either side of
the breakpoint. This corresponds to the second form (ii) of decoupling discussed by Ramberg
and Parsons (2012). The estimated break-date can then be compared to potential break-date
candidates, which are known a priori. To be precise, this study expects a downward shift in both
constant and slope during the second half of 2006.
However, there are three disadvantages to using this approach. (a) There is no account for
time-variant seasonality, which is a key concern in the present context. (b) The assumption that
cointegration holds also after the break-date is too restrictive and excludes the possibility of a
break-down of cointegration altogether. Finally, (c) it does not allow to test for the effect of
break-dates which are known a priori. In the present context, these dates are the opening of the
BBL/Langeled pipelines in 2006 and the pick-up of UK LNG imports in 2008. The next section
introduces the second approach, namely the UCM of the AGIP-UK NBP price differential.
43For computational reasons, a break-point is only identified for the interval ([.15T],[.85T]). See Gregory and
Hansen (1996).
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4.2 Unobserved components model: the AGIP - UK NBP price differential
An alternative approach is to test for the existence and stability of a long-run relationship between
the two natural gas prices directly on the time series characteristics of their differential. This
approach proceeds in two steps. First, an UCM of the price differential is used to determined
whether two exogenous market events had an effect on the stability of the relationship between
the two prices, while controlling for time varying seasonality. Second, if any of the two dates
is found to significantly influence stability, a conventional cointegration model is estimated on
either side of the break-date and the cointegrating properties are assessed pre- and post-break
separately. This then determines whether the relationship has moved from an old to a new stable
long-run relationship, or whether no long-run relationship exists in the post-break period.
Following the methodology set out in Harvey (1989), the AGIP - UK NBP price differential
ymt , defined in equation (1), is modelled as the sum of various unobserved components in a
’local-level’ model44. Formally
ymt = µt + γt +
k∑
i=1
φi,xi,t + t, t ∼ NID(0, σ2 ) (10)
where µt is a stochastic trend, γt is a stochastic seasonal component, xi,t are a set of explanatory
variables and t is an irregular component. The stochastic trend and the stochastic trigonometric
seasonal components are respectively given by
µt = µt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ NID(0, σ2η) (11a)
γt =
s/2∑
j=1
γj,t (11b)[
γj,t
γ∗j,t
]
=
[
cosλj sinλj
−sinλj cosλj
][
γj,t−1
γ∗j,t−1
]
+
[
ωj,t
ω∗j,t
]
,
[
ωj,t
ω∗j,t
]
∼ NID(0, σ2ωI2) (11c)
for j = 1, ..., [s/2] and t = 1, ..., T where λj = 2pij/s is the seasonal frequency, in radians, and ωt
and ω∗t are two mutually uncorrelated NID seasonal disturbances with zero mean and common
variance σ2ω. For s even, the component at j = s/2 collapses to
γj,t = γj,t−1cosλj + ωj,t
As opposed to fixed seasonality, the trigonometric specification allows for a change in the seasonal
pattern across the sample45. This is of particular importance, as the seasonal pattern in ymt is
assumed to diminish somewhat over the sample period. Seasonality in the differential is a result
of winter month re-connection of UK NBP to AGIP, in order attract sufficient gas into the UK
44The estimation for this section is performed in STAMP, a module for OxMetrics, see Koopman S.J. and
Shephard (2009).
45For more details on seasonal components, see Harvey and Scott (1994) and Proietti (2000).
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market through the IUK pipeline. This driver of seasonality, however, is assumed to weaken as
additional import capacity in the form of LNG comes online.
In order to control for the effects of the exceptional winter months of 2005-06, as well as
the deviation of storage injections/withdrawals and temperature from their normal values, three
explanatory variables are included. The third term in equation (10) becomes
3∑
i=1
φi,xi,t = φ1Winter
05/06
t + φ2DSt + φ3DHDDt (12)
where Winter
05/06
t , DSt and DHDDt are defined in equations (2), (3) and (5) respectively.
4.2.1 Testing for structural breaks
In order to test for the existence of structural breaks in the level of the differential, i.e. in the
stochastic trend component, this study follows the intervention analysis methodology by Harvey
(1989). The stochastic trend component is subjected to two interventions, which permanently
shift the level of the trend component, upwards or downwards. More formally, equation (11a) is
redefined as
µt = µt−1 + θbblwbblt + θlngw
lng
t + ηt, ηt ∼ NID(0, σ2η) (13)
where wbblt and w
lng
t are two dummy variables corresponding to the inauguration of the BBL
pipeline (December 2006) and the pick-up of UK LNG imports (November 2008) respectively46.
They are defined as
wbblt =
1 if t = 2006(12)0 otherwise and wlngt =
1 if t = 2008(11)0 otherwise
Assuming that both price series are cointegrated, such that the differential is stationary,
a statistically significant break in the stochastic trend component corresponds to a break of
the cointegration relationship. To be more precise, if the stochastic trend component deviates
significantly from zero at the break dates, the underlying cointegrating vector has changed or
cointegration ceased to hold altogether. In the context of equation (13), this means that if
we can reject the null-hypothesis H0 : θbbl = 0 in favour of the alternative (H1 : θbbl 6= 0),
then there exists a statistically significant structural break in the stochastic trend component of
the AGIP-UK NBP price differential, corresponding to a break in the cointegrating relationship
between the two prices, from December 2006 onwards, the date at which the BBL pipeline became
operational. Similarly, if we can reject the null-hypothesisH0 : θlng = 0 in favour of the alternative
(H1 : θlng 6= 0), then there exists a statistically significant structural break in the stochastic trend
component of the differential, and a break in the cointegrating relationship of the prices, from
46A complete derivation of the model in state space form (SSF) is given in Appendix B.
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November 2008 onwards, the date at which the UK LNG imports started to pick up markedly.
If the effect of any of the two break-dates is statistically significant, indicating a break in the
cointegrating relationship, a cointegrating regression is estimated on each side of the break47.
In contrast to the conventional Gregory and Hansen (1996) approach outlined in the previous
section, there is no need for the assumption that the two natural gas prices are still cointegrated
after the break-date. Cointegration after the break-date will be tested for explicitly. This then
determines whether the prices have merely moved from an old to a new long-run relationship,
or whether there is evidence of decoupling of the third form (iii), such that the prices no longer
maintain a long-term relationship at all.
5 Results
This section discusses the empirical findings. Section 5.1 contains the results of the conventional
cointegration analysis, while section 5.2 presents the results of the unobserved components model
of the price differential.
5.1 Cointegration and stability
A necessary condition for cointegration is that both series, the UK NBP price and the AGIP,
are integrated of the same order. Unit root test on both the levels and first differences of the
log-prices have established this48. Both prices are integrated of order one, i.e. they are I(1).
The results of both the trace and maximum eigenvalue Johansen cointegration tests indicate the
existence of a cointegrating relationship at the 1% significance level over the entire sample period,
September 1999 through September 201149. The corresponding cointegrating vector is given by
[log(nbpOTCt ), -.9719*log(agipt)]
50. Both the Engle-Granger and Phillip-Ouliaris residual based
tests reject a unit root in the residual of the cointegrating regression at the 1% level, only if
the UK NBP series is taken as the dependent variable. Therefore, future estimation will only
consider single-equation cointegrating relationships, the UK NBP being the dependent variable
and treating the AGIP as pre-determined, hence excluding feedback from the UK NBP to the
AGIP51.
47The sign of both θbbl and θlng is expected to be positive. That is, both the inauguration of the BBL pipeline and
the picking-up of UK LNG imports provide additional marginal supply to the UK market, such that a structural
deviation of the prices, even during UK peak demand periods, is feasible. Specifically, UK NBP then trades at a
discount to AGIP, leading to a structural positive widening of the price differential.
48See appendix A.3.
49For detailed results, see table 9 in appendix A.3.
50The estimated β is not significantly different from 1, based on a Wald test on coefficient restrictions, the
results of which are omitted. This is consistent with the result that the price differential ymt , corresponding to a
cointegrating vector of [log(nbpmt ), -log(agipt)] is stationary over the entire sample period.
51The AGIP appears weakly exogenous, which is consistent with a very low adjustment coefficient in the Johansen
test. Exogeneity of the AGIP is not surprising. It is a function of lagged oil product prices (and to a lesser extend
lagged gas prices), which are determined on a global market and can be taken as exogenous for the sake of our
analysis.
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While the analysis over the entire sample confirms the existence of a long-run relationship
with an elasticity of close to 1, verifying stability of this cointegrating vector requires further
evaluation. The results of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test for cointegration under the presence
of an unknown structural break reject the null-hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of the
alternative, cointegration allowing for a break in both constant and slope parameters, at the 5%
significance level52. Although there is slight discrepancy regarding the determined break-date
across the three test statistics, the results indicate that there is a break in both the constant and
slope of the cointegrating relationship between the logarithms of the UK NBP OTC price and
the AGIP during May 2006. For the relationship between the logarithms of the UK NBP front-
month price and the AGIP, the break date is estimated to be August 2006. These endogenously
determined break-points take place in an important year for the UK natural gas market and are
very close to the first LNG shipment into the Isle of Grain LNG terminal (July 2006) and the
opening of the first stage of the Langeled pipeline (September 2006), both sources of additional
gas supply into the UK market.
To determine whether the constant and slope parameters have changed across the break-
date, the cointegrating regression model is estimated three times. The first model, model 1,
uses no break-dummy variable. It is equivalent to the LRM specification in equation (7). The
second model, model 2, is based on the estimated break dummies obtained from the Gregory
and Hansen (1996) method, and assumes a break in the level parameter only. The third model,
model 3, then assumes a full regime shift of both level and slope parameters. It is equivalent to
the model in equation (9)53. Table 4 displays the results for all three models for each of the two
dependent variables. The estimated regression coefficients are meaningful as the null-hypothesis
of no cointegration has been rejected at the 1% level, based on the Gregory and Hansen (1996)
test statistics.
In all three models for both dependent variables, the constant term is negative54. This is as
expected, as in the present sample the UK NBP prices is on average below the AGIP, even before
the opening of the UK to additional import sources. Interestingly, the results of both break
models, models 2 and 3, indicate that this level difference widens substantially, as the coefficient
on the interaction term of break-dummy and level is also negative. Importantly, the coefficient
on the AGIP is much higher in model 2, assuming a break in the constant only, compared to
model 1, which assumes no break in the constant. A 1% increase in the AGIP results in a 1.6%
increase in the UK NBP OTC price, compared to .96% in the model without a break. A similar
52For full details about the test results, see table 10 in appendix A.3.
53The break-dummy variable δτ equals one from 2006(5) or 2006(8) onwards, and zero otherwise, for estimation
of the NBP OTC or front-month series respectively.
54It is noted that Gregory and Hansen (1996) highlight that inference based on the statistical significance of the
OLS estimates of the break dummy terms is highly flawed for various reasons. The robustness of the results are
checked by estimating a split cointegrating regression on both sides of the break dates suggested by the Gregory
and Hansen (1996) method. The qualitative results do not change. The constant decreases in the post-break
sample, whereas the slope parameter increases. The results are presented in table 11 in appendix C. Cointegration
test results for the post-break sample yield conflicting results, which are attributed to the low post-break sample
size.
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difference holds for the front-month model. Moving to the results of the models for both level
and slope breaks, model 3, the elasticity of the UK NBP price to changes in the AGIP does not
markedly vary across the break-date, whereas it was expected that the sensitivity decreases.
Taken together, the effect of allowing for a one-time structural break in the cointegrating
vector, that is in the level parameters or in both the level and slope, results in a significant
downward shift of the cointegrating relationship in the post-break period. Models accounting for
a structural break in the cointegrating vector also provide a better fit to the data, explaining
between 8-10% more of NBP price volatility.
The coefficient on the temperature variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level. That is, hotter than normal months significantly increase the NBP OTC price , all else
being equal. While still positive, the temperature effect is not significant in the front-month
model. This is somewhat intuitive, as current temperature is expected to affect forward prices to
a lesser extent than current prices. Counter to expectations, the effect of storage is negative, yet
only weakly statistically significant in the front-month model. One possible explanation for the
lack of explanatory power of the storage variable is the absence of a seasonal control in the LRM.
Including a large set of monthly dummy variables, however, given the low number of observations
in the post-break sample is problematic.
Table 4: Cointegration Regressions and Endogenous Breaks
Dependent: log(nbpotc) Dependent: log(nbpfront)
m = otc m = front
Break† No τ = 2006(5) τ = 2006(5) No τ = 2006(8) τ = 2006(8)
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3
log(agip) 0.9584*** 1.5587*** 1.5293*** 0.9828*** 1.4912*** 1.4443***
(0.1040) (0.1336) (0.1473) (0.1053) (0.1367) (0.1487)
log(agip)*δmτ - - 0.1283 - - 0.2208
(0.2775) (0.3053)
Dev. Storage -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dev. HDD(b=15.5) 0.0011 0.0027* 0.0029** 0.0004 0.0011 0.0014
(0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0015)
Constant -0.1684 -0.9029*** -0.8338*** -0.1361 -0.7703*** -0.6768***
(0.1874) (0.1950) (0.2135) (0.1896) (0.2040) (0.2203)
Constant*δmτ - -0.6711*** -0.9661* - -0.5743*** -1.0607*
(0.1189) (0.5627) (0.1214) (0.6311)
R2 0.6575 0.7611 0.7657 0.6556 0.7332 0.7389
adj.-R2 0.6499 0.7541 0.7569 0.6480 0.7253 0.7291
N 140 140 140 140 140 140
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level,*** = significant at the 1% level.
(...) Standard errors in parentheses. † break dates estimated using Gregory and Hansen (1996).
Model : 1 no break, 2 break only in level, 3 break in both level and slope parameter.
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As discussed in Ramberg and Parsons (2012), the cointegrating relationship is linear in log-
prices and therefore becomes non-linear once converted back into USD/mmbtu. Figure 9 plots the
cointegrating relationship for the model without a break (model 1) as well as the two pre- and post-
break cointegrating relationships for the model with a level break (model 2). All cointegrating
relationships are plotted for the AGIP price range prevailing over the respective time periods55.
The figure illustrates the drastic change in the implied long-term relationship from before to after
the break date, which is the result of the significant downward change in the log-level56. The new
relationship suggests that after the break in 2006, the range of UK NBP prices which correspond
to a given range of the AGIP is much narrower in equilibrium.
In summary, there is evidence of a clear shift in the cointegrating relationship and a price
decoupling of the second form (ii), in which prices move from an old to a new, much weaker,
long-term relationship. Low post-break sample size, however, makes precise estimation of break
dummy coefficients on the slope difficult and they need to be interpreted with caution. In order
to introduce a seasonal control variable, and examine the effect of two break dates whose timing
is known a priori, the next section will present the results of the alternative modelling approach,
namely the unobserved components model of the price differential.
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Figure 9: UK NBP and AGIP Cointegrating Relationships
55E.g. the observed AGIP price range over the entire sample period is approx. 2-14 USD/mmbtu, whereas the
observed AGIP price range over the pre-2006(5) break period is approx. 2-9 USD/mmbtu.
56Converting the estimated log(nbpm) back into USD/mmbtu by simply exponentiating will underestimate the
UK NBP price due to Jensen’s inequality for convex functions, since exp(E(log(nbpm))) ≤ E(exp(log(nbpm))).
Correcting for the introduced bias involves multiplying the exponentiated estimates by a function of the estimated
residual variance of the LRM. However, all series plotted in figure 9 are from the same estimation, thus correcting
for the bias would shift all curves upwards by an identical amount. The results regarding the relative behaviour of
the cointegrating relationship before and after the break dates therefore remain intact, even without a correction.
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5.2 Unobserved components model: the price differential
This section will present the results of an alternative modelling approach. In a first step, an
unobserved components model is estimated, which is used purely to determine whether two
exogenously given break-dates affect the stability of the relationship between the UK NBP price
and the AGIP. This approach allows to control for time-varying seasonality. In a second step,
conditional on finding a significant break, a conventional cointegration model is estimated on each
side of the break-date. The second step is necessary to determine exactly how the parameters
have changed in the long-run model across pre- and post-break samples and critically whether
the new post-break model can be considered a stable long run relationship or not. The last step
therefore tests for what was maintained implicitly as a restrictive assumption in the previous
approach, namely that both prices are still cointegrated after the break-date.
The conventional cointegration analysis in the previous section has found that a cointegrating
relationship exists when estimated over the entire sample and under the assumption of no struc-
tural breaks. This is consistent with the result that over the entire sample, the price differential
ymt is stationary
57. To exploit the advantages of the unobserved components modelling approach,
a local level model, with a stochastic seasonal component and exogenous control variables is
fitted to the price differential. The basic intuition is that, should the cointegrating relationship
be stable over time, the stationary price differential should have a rather flat trend component,
which is not significantly different from zero. To be more precise, large deviations from zero in
the stochastic trend are an indication of a break in the cointegrating relationship, which can then
be interpreted as either a change in the cointegrating vector or a break-down of cointegration
altogether. Both cases are considered a price decoupling. The results of this estimation are
presented in appendix C, in tables 12 and 13 for the NBP OTC and front-month differentials
respectively. This section will only discuss the results for the NBP OTC price differential, as the
results for the front-month series are somewhat similar.
Before introducing structural break dummies into the trend component, a benchmark model
is determined which best characterizes the dynamic properties of the price differential. Model fit
is evaluated by minimizing the BIC information criterium. A number of specifications are tested
with regard to fixed versus stochastic seasonality, as well as the inclusion of relevant control
variables. They are referred to as models 1-5 in table 12. Best fit is achieved in model 5, only
after controlling for the winter events of 2005/06 as well as temperature deviations from normal.
The temperature control has the expected sign, as an increase in the control, corresponding to
colder than normal months and therefore higher than normal heating demand, is associated with
a higher UK NBP price and hence a lower price differential. While the coefficient of the storage
control has the correct sign, it is not statistically significant in benchmark model 558.
57This corresponds to the cointegrating vector [log(nbpmt ), -log(agipt)].
58It is noted that the results for the front-month estimation are different with respect to the importance of
storage behaviour and temperature deviations. The front-month price differentials is significantly influenced by
storage, with correct sign, whereas temperature appears to have no significant effect. This is expected, as current
temperature is thought to affect current forward prices to a lesser extent than current spot prices. Mu (2007)
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After estimating the parameters of the model, the Kalman filter algorithm produces smoothed
estimates of the unobserved elements, which in the present case are stochastic trend and seasonal
components. They are plotted in figure 10. The seasonal component exhibits a gradual decline
over the sample period. This is as expected, as the opening of the UK market to additional
import infrastructure over the second half of the sample has the potential to diminish the effect
of seasonal arbitrage on the UK NBP price. It is interesting to observe that the decline in
seasonality appears to be mostly driven by lower peaks during the summer months, as opposed
to higher values during the winter months. Given the definition of the price differential, this
suggests that UK NBP prices detach less from the AGIP during the summer, purely based on
seasonal considerations59. It was expected that additional import sources reduce the need to
close the gap between UK NBP and AGIP during the winter peak demand periods.
Importantly, the estimated stochastic trend component shows the expected behaviour. It
remains rather flat and not significantly different from zero up until the beginning of 2006, and
after the first LNG shipment into the UK market. From the middle of 2006, however, the trend
component significantly deviates from zero, indicating that the imposed cointegrating vector no
longer ensures stationarity of the relationship60.
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Figure 10: UC Model 5 (OTC): stochastic trend and break in co-integrating vector
argues that while it seems obvious that the arrival of weather and inventory information will establish a new price
equilibrium in the spot market, the rationale for weather shocks to influence futures prices is more complicated.
59One possible explanation for this could be the additional demand pull on the UK NBP price during the summer,
as imported LNG overflows into the NW European market.
60The imposed cointegrating vector corresponds to the vector [log(nbpmt ), -log(agipt)].
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In the following, the effect of two exogenous break-dates on the stochastic trend component
is examined in models 6 and 7. The dates correspond to the opening of the BBL pipeline in
December 2006, shortly after the completion of the first stage of the Langeled import pipeline,
and the pick-up in UK LNG imports in November 2008. Introducing these intervention dummies
significantly improves the model specification in terms of normality and serial correlation of the
estimated residuals61. However, a statistically significant effect on the stochastic trend component
is only detected for the LNG dummy variable and so the final model (model 7) only contains this
break-date dummy62. Figure 11 compares the actual OTC differential with the fitted differential
of the final specification (model 7)63.
Since the pick-up of LNG imports in the UK in November 2008, the AGIP-NBP OTC differ-
ential has on average increased by 2.63 USD/mmbtu. This effect is significant at the 1% level,
controls for seasonality as well as deviations from normal temperature and is robust to the pres-
ence of the BBL break dummy. Figure 12 illustrates the effect of the LNG break control on
the stochastic trend component. Since November 2008, there is a significant upward shift in the
trend, away from zero, which result in non-stationarity of the price differential. This means that
from this date onwards, there is a significant change in the cointegrating relationship, such that
prices are cointegrated in a different way, or cointegration breaks down altogether, in which case
prices no longer maintain a long-term relationship at all.
61Diagnostic plots of the estimated residuals are displayed in appendix C in figure 19. They show a very low
degree of remaining serial correlation as well as near normality. This section further contains a plot of one-step
predictions of the final model, indicating suitable model specification. The predictive failure χ2(24) test is 26.9598
[0.3063], that is we fail to reject the null hypothesis of correct model predictions at conventional significance levels.
62In contrast to the OTC differential, the front-month differential also contains a highly statistically significant
structural break from December 2006 (BBL pipeline) onwards.
63Appendix C provides additional model components of the final specification, OTC model 7. In particular, the
smoothed estimate of the stochastic trend component, the regression effects as well as the effect of outliers and the
LNG level intervention are illustrated.
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Figure 11: UC Model 7 (OTC): actual and fitted differential
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Figure 12: UC Model 7 (OTC): the effect of LNG on the stochastic trend
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The unobserved components model confirms the significance of the November 2008 break
date, however it does not provide information as to which of the two forms of price decoupling
has taken place. To see which of the two possibilities is more likely, the sample is split according
to the relevant break dates and a cointegrating model is estimated for either side of the break
separately64. Importantly, the Engle-Granger, Phillips-Ouliaris and Hansen cointegration tests
are used to test for stability of the relationships in the split samples. Table 5 presents the results
for the split cointegrating regression.
Consistent with the results of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) methodology in the previous
section, the results indicate a significant decrease in the constant of the cointegrating relationship.
As before, the elasticity of the UK NBP price to changes in the AGIP is higher in the post-break
sample. These results hold for both the OTC and front-month relationships. While the higher
slope parameter in the post-sample period indicates a stronger sensitivity, the much lower constant
results in an overall weaker relationship between the two prices, similar to the one illustrated in
figure 9. The focus of this analysis, however, lies on the results of the cointegration tests performed
on the sub-samples. Both the Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris tests reject the null-hypothesis
of ’no cointegration’ in all full-sample and pre-break sample models. This is confirmed by the
Hansen cointegration test, which fails to reject the null-hypothesis of cointegration.
Moving to the post-break samples, the result are less consistent. Both the Engle-Granger and
Phillips-Ouliaris tests fail to reject the null-hypothesis of no cointegration, which indicates that
no long-term relationship exists post-break. However, the outcomes of the Hansen test statistic
fail to reject cointegration in the post 2006(12) samples. The low number of observations in
the post-break sample can reduce the power of these tests and therefore lead to this apparent
inconsistency. Importantly, the results are in contrast to those of the conventional Gregory and
Hansen (1996) approach. Their test rejects the null-hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of
cointegration with a structural break. In particular, prices are assumed to still be cointegrated
after the estimated break date. However, based on the results of the split regression with a break
at 2006(12), cointegration can neither be accepted nor rejected in the post-break sample.
For the 2008(11) LNG break, the Hansen p-value in the post-break sample of the OTC model
is much lower (p=.13), which makes a rejection of cointegration more likely. In case of the front-
month model, the p-value of the Hansen test is very low and cointegration can safely be rejected.
That is, despite the even lower sample size in this model, the Hansen test confirms the results of
the other two tests that from 2008(11), the UK NBP front-month and AGIP no longer maintain
a stable long-term relationship.
Together with the result of the previous section, there is considerable evidence for a significant
change in the cointegrating relationship between the UK NBP price and the AGIP in the latter
half of the sample period. The results suggest that the break dates in 2006, whether endogenously
estimated using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test or exogenous, are associated with a price
64Note that given the reduced sample size in the split cointegrating regressions, it is preferred to estimate the
models without control variables.
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decoupling from an old to a new, much weaker, cointegrating relationship. No clear evidence
against cointegration can be found from this date onwards, as the test results fail to unanimously
reject it. For the LNG related break in 2008, however, a break-up of cointegration appears much
more likely, and can be confirmed for the UK NBP front-month and AGIP relationship. The
results need to be interpreted with caution, as the low post-break sample size makes inference
difficult.
Table 5: Split Cointegration Regressions UK NBP and AGIP
Dependent Variable: log(NBP −OTC)
Full sample N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2011M09 144 -0.2747* 1.0174*** 0.6793 -4.6463 -4.65315
(0.1489) (0.0825) [0.0011] [0.0011] [> 0.2]
Break 2006(12) N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2006M11 86 -0.4961** 1.2335*** 0.6655 -4.4270 -4.4915
(0.2006) (0.1368) [0.0030] [0.0025] [> 0.2]
2006M12:2011M09 58 -1.7975*** 1.6743*** 0.5890 -2.6023 -2.5196
(0.4169) (0.1883) [0.2505] [0.2838] [0.1707]
Break 2008(11) N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2008M10 109 -0.3108* 1.0680*** 0.7058 -4.4115 -4.4578
0.175077 (0.1054) [0.0028] [0.0024] [> 0.2]
2008M11:2011M09 35 -1.5206** 1.5541*** 0.4738 -1.9869 -1.8954
(0.6063) (0.2767) [0.5418] [0.5873] [0.1343]
Dependent Variable: log(NBP − Front)
Full sample N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2011M09 144 -0.2312 1.0364*** 0.6798 -4.3488 -3.9463
(0.1563) (0.0866) [0.0031] [0.0109] [0.1379]
Break 2006(12) N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2006M11 86 -0.6111*** 1.3796*** 0.7349 -4.4787 -3.8342
(0.1953) (0.1332) [0.0026] [0.0171] [> 0.2]
2006M12:2011M09 58 -1.8862*** 1.7390*** 0.5975 -2.5399 -2.6611
(0.4079) (0.1842) [0.2754] [0.2285] [> 0.2]
Break 2008(11) N Constant log(AGIP ) R2 Engle-Granger τ Phillips-Ouliaris τ Hansen‡
1999M10:2008M10 109 -0.3239* 1.1352*** 0.7310 -4.3516 -3.7310
(0.1797) (0.1081) [0.0034] [0.0212] [> 0.2]
2008M11:2011M09 35 -1.3049*** 1.4708*** 0.4664 -1.9270 -1.8517
(0.4646) (0.2120) [0.5716] [0.6087] [< 0.01]
(...) Standard errors in parentheses. [...] MacKinnon (1996) p-values in parentheses.
‡ Hansen (1992) p-values in parentheses.
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level.
The null-hypothesis of both Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris tests is: no cointegration.
The null-hypothesis of the Hansen test is: cointegration.
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6 Conclusion
The paper empirically investigated the long-term structural relationship between the UK NBP
price for natural gas and the AGIP, a proxy for oil-indexed gas in the NW European market. In
particular, the focus was on the potential of an increase in UK import capacity, both in terms of
import pipelines and LNG regasification capacity, to structurally weaken this long-term relation-
ship, hence lead to a form of price decoupling. Special attention was given to UK spot market
drivers such as seasonality, deviations from normal temperature and storage injection/withdrawal
behaviour. Considered over the entire sample period, from September 1999 through September
2011, both prices were found to be cointegrated and the associated cointegrating vector suggests
a close to unit elasticity between them.
Two approaches were taken to determine the stability of this relationship over time. First, an
endogenous break-date estimation was performed in the Gregory and Hansen (1996) framework.
Hereby, the cointegrating relationship between the two markets was estimated controlling for the
effect of temperature and storage as well as allowing for the presence of a break in both constant
and slope parameters. The test results confirmed cointegration of both prices and suggested
a break date in the middle of 2006. Allowing both the slope and constant parameters in the
cointegrating regression to vary around this break-date improved the model fit considerably,
explaining between 8-10% more of UK NBP price volatility. The results show a significant
weakening of the long-run relationship from 2006 onwards, mainly driven by a substantial decrease
in the constant term in the post-break sample. The new relationship suggests that after the break
in 2006, the range of UK NBP prices which correspond to a given range of the AGIP is much
narrower in equilibrium.
Second, the price differential was analyzed in an unobserved components framework to ac-
count not only for the effects of temperature and storage but also for time-variant seasonality. As
expected, the stochastic trend component exhibits a significant departure from zero starting in
the middle of 2006. This suggsts a break of the previously stable cointegrating relationship in the
year in which additional UK import pipelines came online. The seasonal pattern was found to de-
cline slightly over time, indicating a reduced effect of seasonal arbitrage on the price differential.
In addition to a break in 2006, this methodology also confirmed a significant change in the cointe-
grating relationship from November 2008, the point in time in which UK LNG imports picked up.
Estimating the model on each side of those breaks separately suggests that from 2006 onwards
prices moved from an old to a new, much weaker, long-term relationship. From November 2008
onwards, it appears that the long-term relationship has broken down altogether. Importantly,
this suggest that the pressure on exporters of natural gas into the NW European market, to move
away from oil-indexation and toward gas-indexation of long-term supply contracts, is mounting
and was substantial elevated by the opening of the UK to global LNG trade. It is important
to outline that from November 2008 onwards, Asian LNG markets were tight, and the average
Japanese LNG import price continuously exceeded the AGIP. Given these relative prices, the
break-up of the long-term relationship between UK NBP and AGIP is even more remarkable.
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The results need to be interpreted with caution, as the low post-break sample size makes
inference more difficult. However, it appears that a longer post-break sample would allow one to
either (i) find consistent evidence against cointegration or (ii) find consistent evidence supporting
the new, much weaker, cointegrating relationship. In either case, the tie between the UK NBP
price and the AGIP appears to be significantly severed, the timing of which coincides with the
opening of the UK natural gas market to global arbitrage.
Going forward, the analysis should be repeated as more data becomes available to help de-
termine the cointegrating properties of the post-break model. In addition, including an LNG
spot price marker into the analysis would help determine whether the global price of spot LNG
cargoes has taken over from the AGIP in setting the UK NBP price during periods of peak UK
natural gas demand.
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Appendix A Data analysis
A.1 Anecdotal evidence: 1999-2011
The empirical relationship between the UK and Continental European gas markets, as well as
the average Japanese LNG import price and the price for Brent oil are illustrated in figure
13. During the period 1999-2005, the UK gas market was both liberalized and interconnected
with NW European markets, yet no additional import capacity in the form of pipelines or LNG
terminals was in place. Over this period, the structural connection (or ’coupling’) of UK NBP
to the oil-indexed contract gas price, here approximated by the Average German Import Price
(AGIP), becomes apparent65. Up until 2005, the data suggests that there is empirical evidence
for a seasonal reconnection of UK gas prices to oil-indexed contract prices (AGIP) during the
winter months66. From 2005 onwards, however, there appears to be a structural change to this
relationship, which coincides with the coming online of additional pipeline and LNG import
capacity.
There are several interesting price points during 2005-11. The winter 2005/06 was character-
ized by a severe upward price spike in the UK NBP. For a brief period, the UK NBP spot price
exceeded that of oil-indexed gas by more than 10 USD/mmbtu. Initially, the spike was due to
65The AGIP is a monthly volume weighted import price published by the German Federal Office for Economics
and Export Control (BAFA).
66The fact that UK NBP prices for the summer months are determined by storage arbitrage, whereas the prices
for the winter months by demand and supply imbalances is also maintained by Heather (2010).
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Figure 13: UK NBP day-ahead, AGIP and Japan LNG import price in USD/mmbtu (lhs), Brent
crude oil in USD/bbl (rhs) September 1999-2011, Source: Bloomberg, BAFA
an unexpected cold spell of weather in both the UK and NW Europe, which pushed up demand
for natural gas in both markets. Supported by tight spot LNG markets in Asia and a fire at the
Rough gas storage facility close to Easington (UK), UK NBP prices remained well in excess of
oil-indexed prices until March 200667. The UK and oil-indexed markets diverged again during
the summer of 2006. Both the first leg of the Langeled pipeline and the BBL pipeline, became
operational in September and December 2006 respectively, supplying additional gas into the UK
market. This lead to an obvious divergence of UK from oil-indexed markets during the winter,
which lasted until October 2007 when UK NBP converged again with oil-indexed prices, due to
the continuing decline in UK domestic production, Rogers (2010).
Actual LNG imports started to pick up by the end of October 2008, which coincides with a
significant divergence of UK NBP from oil-indexed prices. The financial crisis in 2008 depressed
the global demand for energy and global spot LNG prices dropped. Spot LNG cargoes therefore
provided a cheaper source for the marginal supply into the UK market during the winter 2008/09,
which caused the NBP to remain significantly below oil-indexed prices. Importantly, there was
no convergence of UK and oil-indexed prices even during the peak demand winter months of
2009/10. This could partially be attributed to lower than normal economic activity during the
weak recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, and resulting lower industrial demand for natural
67Note that the LNG price in figure 13 is an average price. Some spot LNG prices into Japan were in excess of
15 USD/mmbtu, Rogers (2010).
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gas68. However, counteracting this downward pressure on prices was the particularly cold winter
in the UK, resulting in higher than normal residential heating demand69. The global economy
underwent a weak recovery from Q3 2009 onwards, increasing the demand for primary energy.
This, combined with sustained high energy demand from growth markets such as India and
China, has lead to tightening crude oil markets, followed by higher average LNG import prices
for Japan and oil-indexed gas prices in NW Europe. Record low temperatures in the UK during
the winter 2010/11 lead to a convergence of UK NBP with oil-indexed gas prices, as residential
heating demand for natural gas peaked. This convergence of UK and oil-indexed markets is in
line with expectations, as global spot LNG markets were relatively tight and the UK NBP had
to increase to oil-indexed prices in order to attract the marginal supply70.
During Q1 2011, global energy markets started to tighten further for two reasons. First,
February 2011 marked the beginning of the revolutionary uprising in Libya, which resulted in a
significant shortfall in Libyan oil output, increasing global prices for light sweet crude oil. This
provided upward pressure on oil-indexed gas prices, albeit with a lag of 6-9 months. Secondly, the
earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011 and the resulting nuclear incident in Fukushima,
brought a significant share of Japanese nuclear capacity oﬄine. This loss in power generation
capacity was compensated, where possible, by a ramp-up in gas-fired generation, pushing up
Japanese demand for natural gas (LNG) imports.
In summary, the persisting discount at which the UK NBP traded to oil-indexed gas between
Q2 2008 - Q4 2010, in particular the failure to converge during peak winter demand periods, is
a reflection of the availability of additional supply sources to balance the UK market, primarily
spot LNG.
A.2 Descriptive statistics
Visual inspection of the data in figure 5 suggests that the log-prices are non-stationary. Both
prices appear to have a trend, with non-constant mean over time. Further, there appears to
be significant serial correlation in the data, with successive upwards movements followed by an
extended period of successive downward movements. The autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of
both log-prices are plotted in figure 14. They show very high (hence highly significant) auto-
correlations, close to unity, which are decaying only very slowly. This is especially true for the
log AGIP. Further examination of the histogram and implied empirical distributions in figure 14
suggests that both prices are clearly non-normally distributed. The probability distribution of
the log AGIP appears bimodal. These findings are consistent with the presence of a unit root in
both series.
68NBER (2011) dates the recession from Q4 2007 to Q2 2009, from peak to trough respectively, regarding Q3
2009 onwards as a weak, yet expansionary phase of economic recovery.
69The mean UK temperatures for December 2009 and January 2010 were significantly below their respective
long-run averages, see MetOffice (2011).
70For the period December 2009 - July 2011, average LNG import prices for Japan continuously exceeded those
of oil-indexed gas in NW Europe by between 2-5 USD/mmbtu.
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If there is a unit root present, taking the fist-differences (one-month difference) of the log prices
generates a stationary series. The ACFs and distributions of both one-month log differences are
plotted in figure 15. Most autocorrelations appear to be insignificant and the implied empirical
distributions of the one-month differences is closer to a normal distribution. This suggest that
the differenced series are stationary, and the log-prices are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1). For
a formal test of the presence of a unit root in the log prices, see section A.3.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
AGIP UK NBP UK NBP Log Differential Log Differential Dev. Storage Dev. HDD Dev. HDD
Front OTC OTC Front base=15.5 base=18
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141
Mean 6.4501 6.0416 5.5943 0.1885 0.1136 -0.9854 0.6733 0.6491
Median 6.4910 5.2880 4.8000 0.1450 0.1028 1.5406 -2.8933 -4.3750
Maximum 12.9362 18.6203 17.9000 0.9471 0.8154 852.0697 96.1067 96.1067
Minimum 2.4154 1.7814 1.6000 -1.0144 -1.0538 -614.3223 -79.7375 -82.7062
Std. Dev. 2.8585 3.3898 3.1503 0.3160 0.3189 260.8423 25.8353 29.9141
Skewness 0.4013 1.0001 1.0546 -0.3037 -0.2354 0.2011 0.6392 0.5510
Kurtosis 2.0250 3.6163 3.7256 4.2352 3.6911 3.4694 4.4921 3.5140
JB (p-value) 0.0092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.1283 0.3256 0.0000 0.0130
JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality (null hypothesis: normally distributed). The sample covers
September 1999 - September 2011.
Log Differential OTC = ln(AGIP )− ln(NBP OTC) ; Log Differential Front = ln(AGIP )− ln(NBP Front)
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Table 7: Data Cross-Correlations
Log AGIP Log NBP Log NBP Log Differential Log Differential Dev. Storage Dev. HDD Dev. HDD
Front OTC Front OTC base= 15.5 base=18
Log AGIP 1.0000 0.8197 0.8189 0.0272 0.0460 -0.1505 0.4118 0.4454
Log NBP Front 0.8197 1.0000 0.9388 -0.5503 -0.4279 -0.1695 0.3514 0.3714
Log NBP OTC 0.8189 0.9388 1.0000 -0.4447 -0.5357 -0.1235 0.3857 0.4032
Log Differential Front 0.0272 -0.5503 -0.4447 1.0000 0.8139 0.0763 -0.0130 0.0011
Log Differential OTC 0.0460 -0.4279 -0.5357 0.8139 1.0000 -0.0065 -0.0655 -0.0465
Dev. Storage -0.1505 -0.1695 -0.1235 0.0763 -0.0065 1.0000 0.3919 0.3597
Dev. HDD base=15.5 0.4118 0.3514 0.3857 -0.0130 -0.0655 0.3919 1.0000 0.9655
Dev. HDD base=18 0.4454 0.3714 0.4032 0.0011 -0.0465 0.3597 0.9655 1.0000
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A.3 Unit root, cointegration and stability tests
To formally test for the presence of a unit root in the log price series, the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are employed71, the results are provided in table
8. The null-hypothesis of a unit root present in the log-levels of all three price series cannot
be rejected at the 5% significant level. However, applying the tests to the first-differences of
log prices leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root in favour of the alternative, a
stationary first-difference. It can therefore be formally concluded that all log-prices are integrated
of order one.
Table 8: Unit Root Tests
Levels First Differences
t-Statistic Prob.* t-Statistic Prob.*
Log AGIP ADF -1.5847 0.4878 -8.3079 0.0000
PP -1.8995 0.3318 -8.6210 0.0000
Log NBP OTC ADF -2.8369 0.0557 -14.6156 0.0000
PP -2.6473 0.0860 -14.6339 0.0000
Log NBP Front ADF -2.5214 0.1125 -9.3982 0.0000
PP -1.9917 0.2903 -9.3026 0.0000
Log Differential OTC ADF -4.6208 0.0002 - -
PP -4.6237 0.0002 - -
Log Differential Front ADF -4.3322 0.0006 - -
PP -3.9740 0.0021 - -
Differential OTC ADF -3.7060 0.0049 - -
PP -4.9030 0.0001 - -
Differential Front ADF -4.4254 0.0004 - -
PP -4.1584 0.0011 - -
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, including constant. Lag-length
selection based on Schwartz information criterion (min-lag=0, max-lag=13)
Null-hypothesis: the series is integrated of order one, I(1).
ADF= Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP = Phillips-Perron
71For details on the specification of both test statistics, see Hamilton (1994).
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Table 9: Cointegration Tests
Johansen System Cointegration Test
Series: log(agip), log(nbpOTC)
Sample (adjusted): 2000M02 2011M09
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.1336 22.2187 15.4947 [0.0042]
At most 1 0.0152 2.1398 3.8415 [0.1435]
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.1336 20.0789 14.2646 [0.0054]
At most 1 0.0152 2.1398 3.8415 [0.1435]
1 Cointegrating Equation: Log likelihood 288.93
Normalized cointegrating coefficients log(nbpOTC) log(agip)
1.0000 -0.9719
(-0.1008)
Adjustment coefficients Dlog(nbpOTC) Dlog(agip)
-0.3306 0.0219
(-0.0882) (-0.0156)
(...) Standard errors in parentheses. Both Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicate
1 cointegrating equation at the 0.05 level. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Single-Equation Cointegration Tests
Series: log(AGIP ), log(NBP −OTC)
Sample: 1999M09 2011M09
Engle-Granger†
Dependent τ -statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.*
log(UKNBPOTC) -4.6463 0.0011 -37.8681 0.0006
log(AGIP ) -2.9623 0.1260 -17.9166 0.0746
Phillips-Ouliaris
Dependent τ -statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.*
log(NBP −OTC) -4.6531 0.0011 -37.9991 0.0006
log(AGIP ) -3.6469 0.0252 -24.0454 0.0189
Null-hypothesis: Series are not cointegrated. † automatic lags specification
based on Schwarz criterion (maxlag=13). *MacKinnon (1996) p-values.
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Table 10: Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration with structural break test
Dependent: UK NBP OTC Test stat. Breakpoint τ Breakpoint
ADF†
C -5.8542*** (0.54) 2006M02
C/S -5.8626*** (0.54) 2006M02
Zt
C -5.6700*** (0.56) 2006M05
C/S -5.7069*** (0.56) 2006M05
Zα
C -51.9027*** (0.56) 2006M05
C/S -52.6916** (0.56) 2006M05
Dependent: UK NBP Front Test stat. Breakpoint τ Breakpoint
ADF†
C -5.4669*** (0.58) 2006M08
C/S -5.5412*** (0.58) 2006M08
Zt
C -4.9809** (0.57) 2006M06
C/S -5.0039** (0.58) 2006M08
Zα
C -45.3522** (0.57) 2006M06
C/S -45.8005* (0.57) 2006M06
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant
at the 1% level. † automatic lags specification based on BIC (maxlag=10).
Null-hypothesis: series are not cointegrated. Alternative-hypothesis: series are
cointegrated with shift only in constant (C) or in constant and slope (C/S).
Approximate asymptotic critical values for single explanatory variable,
Gregory and Hansen (1996)
Level 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.1
ADF and Zt
C -5.13 -4.83 -4.61 -4.34
C/S -5.47 -5.19 -4.95 -4.68
Zα
C -50.07 -45.01 -40.48 -36.19
C/S -57.17 -51.32 -47.04 -41.85
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A.4 UK gas balance: 2000-2011.
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Figure 16: UK Natural Gas Balance (mcm/day) Jan 2000 - Sept 2011, Source: DECC, National
Grid, author’s calculation
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Appendix B State space form and the Kalman filter.
Following Harvey (1989), the model outlined in section 4.2 is equivalent to
ymt = µt + γt +
k∑
i=1
φi,xi,t + θbblw
bbl
t + θlngw
lng
t + t, t ∼ NID(0, σ2 )
where the intevention dummies are now defined as a step impulse, given by
wbblt =
1 if t >= 2006(12)0 otherwise and wlngt =
1 if t >= 2008(11)0 otherwise
and all remaining elements are as introduced in section 4.2. The model can be formulated as a
linear state space model specified by the equations
yt = Zαt +Dxt + t, t ∼ NID(0, σ2 ) (14)
αt = Tαt−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ NID(0, H) (15)
where (14) is the measurement equation, relating the observed yt to the unobserved state vector
αt. The state vector is modelled as a VAR(1) and contains the stochastic trend as well as the
stochastic seasonal component. It is given by
αt = (µt γ1,t γ
∗
1,t γ2,t γ
∗
2,t ... γ[ s−2
2
],t γ
∗
[ s−2
2
],t
γ[s/2],t)
′ (16)
where the first element corresponds to the stochastic trend and the remaining (s − 1) terms to
the trigonometric seasonal. The associated error vector ξt is given by
ξt = (ηt ω1,t ω
∗
1,t ω2,t ω
∗
2,t ... ω[ s−2
2
],t ω
∗
[ s−2
2
],t
ω[s/2],t)
′
The vector xt contains the explanatory variables, described in section 3, and redefined structural
break dummies:
xt = (Winter
05/06
t DSt DHDDt w
bbl
t w
lng
t )
′
The system variables Z, D, T , σ2 and H depend on unknown parameters, which are estimated
by maximizing the Gaussian log-likelihood function of the model. They are given by
Z = (1 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 1)
D = (φ1 φ2 φ3 θbbl θlng)
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T =

1 0 0 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 cosλ1 sinλ1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 −sinλ1 cosλ1 0 0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 cosλ2 sinλ2 0 · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 −sinλ2 cosλ2 0 · · · · · · 0
0 0 0 0 0
. . . · · · · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
... cosλ s−2
2
sinλ s−2
2
0
...
...
...
...
...
... −sinλ s−2
2
cosλ s−2
2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 cosλ[s/2]

H =
[
σ2η 0
0 σ2ωIs−1
]
Once the unknown parameters in the system variables are estimated via maximum likelihood, the
unobserved components can be recovered using the Kalman filtering and smoothing equations.
Harvey (1989) and Durbin and Koopman (2001) provide a complete derivation of the Kalman
filter algorithm and associated likelihood functions.
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Appendix C Additional model output
Table 11: Split Cointegration Regressions UK NBP and AGIP - Endogenous Breaks
Cointegration Regression
Dependent: log(nbpotc) Dependent: log(nbpfront)
Sample Full 1999M09: 2006M05: Full 1999M09: 2006M08:
2006M04 2011M09 2006M07 2011M09
log(agip) 0.9584*** 1.4070*** 1.6964*** 0.9828*** 1.3505*** 1.6321***
(0.1040) (0.1668) (0.1837) (0.1053) (0.1626) (0.2263)
Dev. Storage -0.0001 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.000209 -0.0007*** 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dev. HDD(b=15.5) 0.0011 0.0039 0.0004 0.000393 0.000614 0.0005
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0017)
Constant -0.1684 -0.6486** -1.8448*** -0.136062 -0.5475** -1.6263***
(0.1874) (0.2466) (0.4034) (0.1896) (0.2461) (0.4984)
R2 0.6575 0.7122 0.6026 0.6556 0.7130 0.5319
N 140 75 65 140 78 62
Single-equation cointegration tests
Dependent: log(nbpotc) Dependent: log(nbpfront)
Sample Full 1999M09: 2006M05: Full 1999M09: 2006M08:
2006M04 2011M09 2006M07 2011M09
Engle-Granger
τ -statistic -4.5798 -5.1637 -2.7318 -4.214026 -3.885802 -2.4720
[0.0175] [0.0046] [0.5684] [0.0457] [0.1067] [0.6948]
z-statistic -36.7555 -40.6047 -13.6811 -36.12684 -26.43683 -10.9636
[0.0136] [0.0027] [0.5500] [0.0155] [0.0783] [0.7128]
Phillips-Ouliaris
τ -statistic -4.5756 -5.2046 -2.6904 -3.953663 -4.071479 -2.7557
[0.0177] [0.0041] [0.5892] [0.0836] [0.0728] [0.5570]
z-statistic -36.6749 -41.5643 -13.2196 -29.40926 -29.49681 -14.0209
[0.0138] [0.0021] [0.5781] [0.0583] [0.0419] [0.5263]
Hansen ‡ [> 0.2] [> 0.2] [> 0.2] [0.0491] [> 0.2] [> 0.2]
(...) Standard errors in parentheses. [...] MacKinnon (1996) p-values in parentheses.
‡ Hansen (1992) p-values in parentheses.
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level.
The null-hypothesis of both Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris tests is: no cointegration.
The null-hypothesis of the Hansen test is: cointegration.
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Table 12: UC Estimation Output - Dependent variable: Differential OTC
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Final State
Level 1.8898 2.2061 2.2508 2.1121 2.0282 -2.1644 -0.7802
(p-value) (0.0151) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0700) (0.3912)
Seasonality Fixed Fixed Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic
Controls
Outlier 2005(2) - -5.4397*** -5.0587*** -4.9687*** -5.1346*** -5.0903*** -5.0826***
[0.7613] [0.7579] [0.7550] [0.7494] [0.7333] [0.7349]
Outlier 2005(11) - -5.6266*** -4.9945*** -4.9311*** -5.2699*** -5.3041*** -5.1776***
[0.8377] [0.8527] [0.8481] [0.8263] [0.8095] [0.8085]
Winter 05/06 - -5.6565*** -5.9881*** -5.9742*** -5.7795*** -5.6249*** -5.6895***
[0.6633] [0.6734] [0.6679] [0.6486] [0.6057] [0.6125]
Dev. Storage - - -0.0007** -0.0005 - - -
[0.0003] [0.0003]
Dev. HDD(b=15.5) - - - -0.0058 -0.0084** -0.0083*** -0.0091***
[0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Structural Breaks
BBL/Langeled - - - - - 1.31318 -
(December 2006) [0.7627]
LNG - - - - - 2.6647*** 2.6280***
(November 2008) [0.7570] [0.7689]
Diagnostics
Doornik-Hansen 76.924 12.286 7.892 6.998 9.269 7.267 6.059
Box-Jung Q-statistic (0.0553) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0164) (0.0172)
(p-value)
PEV 1.9915 0.6866 0.7058 0.7083 0.6989 0.6298† 0.6454
Rs2 0.2251 0.7389 0.7384 0.7416 0.7363 0.7660 0.7583
Log-L -77.2817 -8.99255 -17.5269 -21.2719 -11.9751 -6.72134 -7.40349
BIC 1.1351 0.1731 0.2350 0.2729 0.2252 0.1898 0.1800†
AIC 0.86822 -0.1554 -0.1140 -0.0967 -0.1238 -0.2003† -0.1896
[..] Standard errors in parentheses. Doornik-Hansen test for normality, distributed χ2(2) under the null hypothesis
of normality. The 5% critical value of χ2(2) is 5.99. BIC = Bayesian Schwartz Criterion; AIC = Akaike Information
Criterion; PEV = prediction error variance. Log-L = Log Likelihood. The sample period for the model analysis is
January 2000 through Septemer 2011. † break model that minimizes the respective (information) criterion.
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level
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Table 13: UC Estimation Output - Dependent variable: Differential Front
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Final State
Level 0.9160 1.0348 1.0073 -5.9681 -4.5338
(p-value) (0.0473) (0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0013)
Seasonality Fixed Stochastic Stochastic Fixed Stochastic
Controls
Outlier 2005(11) - -4.7233*** -3.9156*** -4.7983*** -4.4283***
[0.8400] [0.8492] [0.8634] [0.8424]
Outlier 2006(2) - 3.0367*** 2.8976*** 3.1720*** 2.9215***
[0.8400] [0.8165] [0.8283] [0.8073]
Winter 05/06 - -3.6697*** -3.9341*** -3.8325*** -3.7126***
[0.9039] [0.9258] [0.7630] [0.8609]
Dev. Storage - - -0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0006**
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
Dev. HDD(b=15.5) - - -0.00417 -0.0033 -
[0.0036] [0.0036]
Structural Breaks
BBL/Langeled - - - 3.1660*** 2.8381***
(December 2006) [0.8411] 0.90554
LNG - - - 3.4558*** 2.5803***
(November 2008) [0.8324] [0.9063]
Diagnostics
Doornik-Hansen 122.050 14.203 11.484 14.798 13.215
Box-Jung Q-statistic (0.0645) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.1323) (0.0677)
(p-value)
PEV 1.3667 0.8233 0.7937 0.6222† 0.7503
Rs2 0.0886 0.4634 0.5013 0.6154 0.5286
Log-L -52.6300 -15.7145 -27.9571 -19.2932 -20.1215
BIC 0.7586 0.3548 0.3867 0.2119† 0.3648
AIC 0.49172 0.0263 0.0172 -0.1987† -0.0253
[..] Standard errors in parentheses. Doornik-Hansen test for normality, distributed χ2(2)
under the null hypothesis of normality. The 5% critical value of χ2(2) is 5.99. BIC =
Bayesian Schwartz Criterion; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; PEV = prediction
error variance; Log-L = Log Likelihood. The sample period for the model analysis is
January 2000 through Septemer 2011. † model that minimizes the respective
(information) criterion. * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level,
*** = significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 17: UC Model 7 (OTC): stochastic trend component
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Figure 18: UC Model 7 (OTC): regression components and structural breaks
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Standardised Residuals +/− 2SE 
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Figure 19: UC Model 7 (OTC): residual diagnostics
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Figure 20: UC Model 7 (OTC): in-sample predictions
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